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    Export Control Takes Front and Center Stage Position

    Over the past several months, Export Control has become a topic of interest, debate, and some consternation at Georgia Tech. Emphasis on this topic has been renewed, given Georgia Tech's expansion to overseas sponsored projects and collaborations with international participants, and the recent heightened concerns about homeland security through the potential misuse of dual-use technologies or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unveiling technologies to global economic competitors, the imposition of significant institutional and personal penalties at other universities and companies.

    What is export control? How does it affect your teaching or research? Do export control issues impact your interactions with colleagues or students from abroad? Are export control laws and regulations compatible with the open environment at American universities?

    Export control laws and regulations govern any verbal communication and the transfer of written documents, certain technology, and U.S.computer software to a foreign national (whether in the U.S. or abroad if the technology is controlled by export regulations). As defined, technology includes information related to the design, development, or production of equipment or software. Transfers of listed technologies to non-U.S. persons or entities in the form of drawings, schematics, blueprints, research results, formulae, meetings, symposiums, classroom discussions, conversations, email, etc, are controlled. If any controlled information, technology, software, or equipment is to be transferred to another party overseas or to a foreign party in the United States, a license must be obtained prior to the transfer unless a valid licensing exception or exclusion applies.

    Export control regulations are administered by several agencies. Of particular relevance to Georgia Tech are these three with jurisdiction: the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce. Regulations of the Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) prohibit interactions with countries subject to embargoes, trade sanctions, and boycotts. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regulations are overseen by the Department of State and involve military technologies. The Commerce Department's Export Administration Regulations (EAR) govern primarily "dual-use" technologies, which are usually intended for civil, non-military purposes. Depending on various factors, a license is required from either the Department of Commerce or State for disclosure of controlled technical information. Certain exclusions from these requirements may exist. There are some exemptions from the licensing requirements that may provide relief from ITAR and EAR including the educational information exclusion, public domain exclusion and the fundamental research exclusion.

    In recent remarks, David H. McCormick, Deputy Undersecretary for the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), commented on the current technological revolution and its relationship to national security. "From smart bombs to iPods, technology is changing the way we wage war and live in peace… But our many efforts might fail in their broader objective if the United States does not maintain its current lead in cutting edge technologies. Technology is the currency both of commerce and security, and BIS will work with you to maintain U.S. leadership in areas of technology essential to national security and economic vitality. On the top of our list is the effective implementation of a practical deemed export rule, one which gives U.S. business, universities, and research institutions – but not terrorists, proliferators, or other adversaries – access to the world’s best minds."

    Can you ignore export controls?

    No. You, as an individual, and Georgia Tech, as your employer, can be held liable for improperly transferring controlled technology.; It is important that you review the federal requirements.Violators may be subject to criminal and administrative penalties. Criminal penalties can include up to 10 years imprisonment and $1 million per violation; administrative penalties can reach $11,000 per violation, and $120,000 per violation in certain administrative cases involving national security issues. Violators may also be subject to denial of their export privileges. A denial of export privileges prohibits a person from participating in any way in any transaction subject to the EAR. Furthermore, it is unlawful for other businesses and individuals to participate in any way in an export transaction subject to the EAR with a denied person.

    Should you change how you conduct your research or teaching activities?

    Probably not. However, you should be aware of export control and understand if and when your research or activities fall under its shadow. In general, most of Georgia Tech's research and teaching activities can be excluded from export controls because of specific fundamental research exemptions built into export control regulations. Even when these are not clearly excluded, it is often possible to obtain licenses that permit the sharing of information and technology. The Office of Legal Affairs can help you to better understand the export control regulations and determine if and when they impact your research and other scholarly activities.

    Some examples follow to demonstrate what can happen when export controls have been ignored:

    • Government Investigates UT Electrical and Computer Engineering Professor For Export Control Violation
    • Oklahoma State University posted the following notice on its Export Control website: "OSU has been contacted by a Special Agent from the Bureau of Industry and Security's enforcement division. He informed us that it has come to his attention that last fall a person or persons from an Oklahoma university or college (not necessarily OSU) was in contact with the Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology (HIAST) in Syria. HIAST has now been placed on the BIS's 'denied entity list' (i.e. a 'blacklist' - Supplement No. 4 to Part 744--page 13 and 70 FR 11861 3/10/05). He warned us that further contact with HIAST could result in penalties being imposed by the BIS's enforcement division. Penalties would most likely be financial in nature and would affect not only the individual but also OSU. Please note that in this regard, 'contact' means travel to, hosting a visitor from, e-mail, telephone or mail contact with, or discussions with persons from HIAST." See http://www.export.gatech.edu/?section=whatsnew.
    • EMD Biosciences, Inc. (EMD): Exported biological toxins to Canada in violation of the Export Administration Regulations. Civil penalty of $904,500. Export privileges denied for two years, all of which is suspended provided that EMD commits no violations of the EAR during the period of suspension.
    • Sigma-Aldrich: Illegal export of biological toxins in 1997. Fined $1,760,000 in civil penalties.
    • Omega Engineering: Illegal export of laboratory equipment to Pakistan. Fined $313,000 in penalties; export probation 5 years. Vice President fined $50,000; sentenced to 10 months of confinement, followed by 3 years of supervised probation.
    • Dr. Thomas Butler, M.D. professor at Texas Tech University: Illegal export of bacteria to Tanzania. Convicted of 47 count indictment and sentenced to 2 years in prison; fired from university. This case was exacerbated by Dr. Butler’s false report to the FBI that some 30 vials of yersinia pestis (the causative agent of human plague) had been stolen from his university laboratory.

    These examples and more are listed on the Bureau of Industry and Security website’s hair-raising publication at http://www.bis.doc.gov/ComplianceAndEnforcement/Dont_Let_This_Happen_To_You_2005.pdf.